Emergent Conversation 24

This essay is part of the series Kurdistan(s): Repression, Resistance, and the Fight for Survival,
PoLAR Online Emergent Conversation 24

By Hardy Mède

In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), the only part of the divided Kurdistan to have attained internationally recognized federal autonomy since 2005, partisan politics remains largely unexplored by the social sciences, yet political organizations occupy a prominent place, as they dominate society and play a key role in governing the population. In recent years, although Kurdish political parties have attracted the attention of some researchers in political science and sociology (Mède 2016, 2023; Quesnay 2021), they remain largely neglected in anthropology. Iraqi Kurdistan has more than fifty political parties, but only about ten of them manage to be represented in the regional parliament, and even fewer in the federal parliament. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) remain the most influential parties, due to their control over the country’s economy and the power of their armed forces. Facing these two historical parties, new groups are beginning to gain influence, such as the New Generation Movement, founded in 2017. This piece offers some preliminary anthropological reflections on these political parties. It discusses their structure, identity, ritual, and symbolic practices.

The Party Structure: Platform Party and Patrimonial Party

Iraqi Kurdish society has been significantly impacted by the arrival of new digital and communications technologies for two decades. Its mode of production as well as its organization are influenced by the emergence of the “network society” (Castells 2009). This evolution has had an impact on political parties, whether new or traditional. The appropriations of digital and social networks by new political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, such as the New Generation Movement (Newey Nwê 2017), the Popular Front (Berey Gel 2024) and Halwest (2024), are visible at different levels, both in external communication and in internal organization. They are characterized by a very flexible structure, little institutionalization, and direct communication with society. These new parties resemble “platform parties,” as theorized by Pablo Gerbaudo(2019), because they are relatively dematerialized, even disintermediatized. Indeed, they do not have territorial anchoring, with the exception of a headquarters, which leaves them without anchorage. Furthermore, it is entirely appropriate to describe the New Generation Movement (NGM), a liberal party, as a “television party,” defined by the political scientist Gerbaudo (2019) as a party “for which television, rather than the press or partisan propaganda, becomes the primary means of communication with the electorate, as well as a substitute for committed activism” (42-43). The NGM expresses itself and communicates through its TV channel mouthpiece, NRT, with massive use of social networks.

The arrival of digital technologies has also influenced traditional political parties, such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), founded in 1946, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), founded in 1975. Both have massively integrated social media and communication technologies for two decades. Both parties have developed remarkable digital activism on social media, with thousands of paid journalists and activists who publicly support their actions and positions. They also have vast media companies, including hundreds of television channels, radio stations, online press, and other media outlets. However, this digital modernity has only relatively affected their organization and internal operating methods, which still remain very close to those of a mass party, and it coexists with a strong tendency toward patrimonialism, in the Weberian (1922) sense of the term (include a date for a Weberian text on this, his 1922 Economy and Society).

Both parties, and to some extent the Gorran Movement, are dominated by families and operate like family businesses^[1]. Indeed, each party is structured either around a single family, as is the case with the KDP led by the Barzani family, or around several families, as is the case with the PUK. While the PUK is increasingly controlled by Talabani’s sons, they must run the organization in collaboration with the families of Kosrat Rasul (a former Politburo member) and Ibrahim Ahmed (Jalal Talabani’s father-in-law). Formed at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, The Barzani family (known locally as the Sheikhs) descends from the Naqishbandi Sufi order, which has dominated the political scene in Iraqi Kurdistan for at least two decades, as well as from an affective community, in the Weberian sense of the term, designated in Kurdish by the word Millet (approximately people) (Mède 2022).

The KDP perfectly illustrates the patrimonial party model for several reasons. Access to the party’s central bodies follows a logic of familial reproduction of power. Although the congress’s role is to renew these bodies, it does not represent a true moment of democratic uncertainty, to use Claude Lefort’s expression, because it is tightly controlled. At the 14th party conference in November 2022, Masoud Barzani, party president since 1979, submitted a list of favorite candidates to conference participants from which they would elect the 51 members of the Central Committee. He personally appoints the members of the KDP’s politburo. Furthermore, in the last two conferences, the thirteenth held in December 2010 and the fourteenth in 2023, he established a clear line of succession within the party: Nechirvan Barzani and Masrour Barzani, respectively Masoud Barzani’s nephew and son, were appointed co-vice presidents. The composition of the KDP politburo follows a logic of replacement rather than renewal. The family logic of reproducing power at the top of the party hierarchy is matched by the family’s transmission of activism at the local level and at the party’s grassroots. These two complementary logics, however, remain distinct: grassroots activists rarely reach the party’s leadership sphere, and historical leaders and their descendants are rarely demoted in the party hierarchy. Within the KDP, family is the primary basis for party commitment and conditions party loyalty based on a patrilineal logic. Consequently, individual forms of engagement and disengagement are rare. Associations, professionals, and networks of acquaintances (families, neighborhoods and villages) are the main recruitment grounds (Mède 2023). Principally, the KDP operates according to a centralized organization, with a single leadership and a hierarchical structure.

This tendency toward centralization is also observable in the PUK. After experiencing a period of fragmentation of power, disunity and prolonged indiscipline in recent years, the PUK has since its fifth conference in 2023, restructured itself, under the leadership of Bafel Talabani, who embodies centralized leadership. Today, the PUK projects the image of a united, factionless, and disciplined party. For its activists, this unity and discipline are essential conditions for the party’s revival.

Party Identity

Activism in the KDP and the PUK involves appropriating the party’s history, hierarchies, symbols, and terminology. Both parties have a nomenclature, which functions like a party repertoire, to designate the different levels of hierarchy, but also to name certain social categories, such as students, women, and youth. Both parties have established significant training structures, such as training institutes for cadres (paymangay kadiran), short-term training sessions, and seminars. These initiatives, in collaboration with the party’s media and press, are essential for shaping a party identity aligned with the party’s history, ideology, nationalism, relationship with the federal state, and geographic presence.

The KDP is perceived by its activists as the one that embodies Kurdish nationalism and defends Kurdish gains against Baghdad. The relationship between the KDP and Baghdad remains ambiguous, as the party actively participates in federal institutions while presenting Baghdad as an enemy. The KDP’s construction of a negative identity for Baghdad serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, it allows the party to justify the failure of its economic project, namely the economic independence announced in July 2015. On the other, it supports economic or oil nationalism in the face of a federal state that seeks to monopolize the oil resources located in the territories of the Regional Government.

On the other hand, the PUK embodies a disembedded nationalism, which is distinguished by three elements. First, it is a nationalism whose sustainability does not depend on a closed Kurdish inner circle, which marks an evolution compared to a traditional independence-seeking nationalism. Second, it is a nationalism that no longer seeks to build itself against Baghdad or with it; on the contrary, it opens up to Baghdad. Finally, the PUK does not hesitate to rely on Baghdad in its quest for power within the Kurdistan region.

Ideologically, these two parties remain difficult to define precisely, as they have an ideologically vague discourse, similar to those of “catch-all” parties (Kirchheimer 1990). However, with their several hundred thousand members and their rigid, vertically organized structure, they resemble mass parties (Duverger 1951). Economically, the discourse of the two parties and government actions reveal a clear inclination towards economic liberalization and privatization. From this perspective, it seems appropriate to describe them as a hybrid party, that is, they are at the same time liberal, socialist and nationalist.

Partisan identity is also forged through the relationship to territory, which acts as a physical, symbolic, and emotional space. The KDP’s identity has crystallized around two territorial references: the municipality of Masif-Salahadin (Pirmam), which houses the party headquarters and Masoud Barzani’s palace (Sariblind), and the town of Barzan, where the Barzani community and Mustafa Barzani’s grave are located. These two locations reflect two types of allegiance that activists grant: one to the party and the other to the Barzani family. The latter ensures the longevity of the former because it is perceived by party activists as sacred. The Barzani family plays a vital role in the party’s stability, channeling activists’ discontent through public statements, while maintaining their loyalty that makes them unlikely to defect. This discontent is thus placed in a waiting situation, where activists hope to obtain some form of redress.

This connection with the territory is also manifested through the parties’ choice of headquarter locations. Both traditional parties, as well as the Gorran Movement, have opted for high-elevation locations, likely because altitude is generally associated with authority or grandeur. For example, the KDP chose Pirmam and Sariblind, located a few hundred meters above sea level, for their headquarters; the PUK settled on Dabashan Hill in Sulaimani, while the Gorran Movement chose Zargata Hill, also in Sulaimani. While new political parties that advocate political renewal choose less symbolic locations, they often establish themselves in the heart of the city. For example, the Popular Front, led by Lahour Sheikh Gangi, established its headquarters at the Lalazar Hotel, which has become a part of its identity. The New Generation Movement, for its part, chose the German Village (a new neighborhood) as its headquarters.

Ritual and Symbolic Practices of the Parties

The Kurdish novelist Bakhtyar Ali describes the KDP and the PUK as “modern tribes.” If the author uses the term “tribe” in a normative and contemptuous manner, why not take this remark seriously, as Florence Faucher (2021) suggests in another context. Political parties, like tribes, possess their own culture, with rites, symbolic practices, festivals, and an ‘asabiyyah (esprit de corps) that ensures the cohesion and unity of their members.

From an anthropological perspective, funerary practices and the veneration of leadership figures play a central role in the construction of collective identity and the transmission of values. Traditional parties such as the KDP, the PUK, and the Gorran Movement have built mausoleums around the graves of their leaders, often located near their headquarters or in symbolic locations. For example, Jalal Talabani rests on Dabashan Hill, Nawshirwan Mustafa on Zargata Hill, while Mustafa Barzani was buried in his hometown of Barzan. These sites have become gathering spaces where activists, national and international delegations come to pay their respects. Barzani’s mausoleum, accompanied by a museum dedicated to him, attracts tens of thousands of visitors each year, including activists, party officials, as well as western diplomats and representatives. His mausoleum has become a place of remembrance that has transformed into a veritable pilgrimage site, embodying powerful symbols that help shape an official narrative around the leader, presenting him as the founding father of the Kurdish nation. The story of Mustafa Barzani and that of his family are elevated to a sacred heritage, but also a political doctrine (rebazi Barzani), a moral code, and a way of life that activists must follow and adopt.

Kurdish parties have also established a powerful cult around martyrs, using stories, speeches, songs, and commemorations to glorify them. They use the figure of the martyr as a tool for mobilization, unification, and legitimization of their power. Thousands of martyrs, considered the heirs of these sacrifices, are now integrated into public policies: they receive compensation (qarabu), monthly pensions (shahidana), and other privileges (Mède 2023). Each party constructs a heroic narrative and organizes regular rituals, such as ceremonies on death anniversaries or commemorative days, in order to anchor the memory of the martyr into the collective consciousness of its activists. However, this category of martyr remains primarily partisan and exclusive, used by each party to strengthen its legitimacy and social base. There is no desire to make the martyr a common symbol shared by the entire Kurdish nation. From this perspective, Kurdish parties do not hesitate to sometimes denigrate the history of their opponents’ respective martyrs in order to tarnish the memory of their political opponents and rewrite history, which has become a major issue in Iraqi Kurdistan. Furthermore, within both major Kurdish parties (KDP and PUK) certain daily rituals have become routine. For example, within the KDP, an excellent cadre stands out for their ability to skillfully navigate the social fabric. Aside from their organizational activities, often carried out in the morning, a typical day for a cadre revolves mainly around visiting the families of activists, martyrs, and the sick, attending funerals, as well as participating in medal award ceremonies, festivals, and various sports and social activities organized in the neighborhood or village.

Addressing the parties’ rites and symbolic practices requires a careful consideration of Iraqi Kurdish party congresses. These congresses are not limited to a simple gathering; they also serve as a rite of consecration (Bourdieu 1982) for various purposes. The last two KDP congresses, in 2010 and 2023, marked important moments when the party’s patrimonialism became official. This is not only due to the election of Netchirvan Barzani and Masrour Barzani as party vice-presidents, nor to the promotion of several members of the Barzani family to the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. It is mainly because Massoud Barzani, the party’s president, defines it as the continuation of the Barzani community and urges its members to adopt the community’s doctrine in order to become part of it. The last PUK congress in 2023 played a similar role: Talabani’s sons used the event to sideline dissenting voices and veterans, thus consolidating their hold on the party. Bafel Talabani, elected president, granted himself more than 60 prerogatives in the statutes adopted by the congressmen.

To conclude, studying political parties from an anthropological perspective allows us to understand the social, cultural, and symbolic dynamics that underlie their functioning and influence. Political parties are not only institutional organizations, but also social groups with specific rituals, symbols, and practices (meetings, speeches, campaigns). In this regard, political parties, like some in the Middle East, have their own rituals, such as the funeral rite and procession, the martyrdom commemoration ceremony, and their political liturgies (investiture of leaders, party celebrations, the leader’s exit and convoys, etc.). Furthermore, political parties are often also vectors of collective identity like social class, ethnicity, and religion. From an anthropological perspective, Iraqi Kurdish parties are fertile sites for observation because some defend a sovereign nationalism, like the KDP, while the PUK defends a regionalized nationalism that is open and consensual with the federal state.

The dynamics of patrimonialism of Iraqi Kurdish parties constitute an important anthropological phenomenon to study. The KDP’s model, led by a single family that controls and manages its affairs, has been generalized by the majority of parties. Indeed, many political actors share the idea that to ensure the longevity and proper functioning of a party, it is necessary to place it under the supervision of a single family. According to them, this approach resolves internal leadership conflicts by providing clear and operational direction. The digitization of Kurdish parties, as well as the emergence of certain platform parties in Iraqi Kurdistan that are gaining influence on the political scene, also represent important new anthropological avenues to explore.

Hardy Mède is an Associate professor at the Catholic University of Paris. He works on Iraq and Kurdistan. His work is part of the sociology of the state and partisan sociology.

Note

^[1] Founded in 2009 by Nawshirwan Mustafa, this political movement was able to establish itself electorally in 2009 and 2013 as the god-numbered political force; but the party experienced a major secession in 2024 and became electorally insignificant.

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